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Conclusion
The firmly established doctrine of right of privacy will undoubtedly
be modified but little in its application to television. As shown by the
result of the Gautier case, this new medium may further reduce the
already small distinction between common law and statutory rights of
privacy. The rules for determining liability for violation of the right by
newspapers, magazines, motion pictures, and radio broadcasts can be
applied in almost all situations involving television. In borderline cases
only, where old rules do not apply because of television's unique feature
- instantaneous transmission of the picture - the policy of the courts
should be to favor the telecaster. Freedom of speech and of the press
and public interest in news and general information in those situations
are more important than the right of privacy.
Edward L. Burke
RECENT DECISIONS
CHURCH AND STATE - RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES - LEGISLATIVE CON-
TROL OF CHURCH PROPERTY - SUPREMACY OF ECCLESIASTICAL ADjuD-
ICATIONS. - Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox
Church in North America, ..U.S ....., 73 S.Ct. 143, (1952). This case
involves an action of ejectment in which the issue was the right to pos-
session and use of a cathedral in New York City. Appellants occupy the
premises as the appointees of the Patriarch and Holy Synod of Russian
Orthodox Greek Catholic Churches in Moscow. Respondents represent
a separatist movement of the Russian Orthodox Church in the United
States which developed after the revolution in Russia in 1917. This
faction, though spiritually identical with the mother church, declared
its administrative autonomy in 1924 because it refused to recognize a
"Renovated Church" sponsored by the Bolshevik government (subse-
quently conceded to be schismatic).
Since 1945 both the separatist group and the appellant have recog-
nized the spiritual leadership of the Russian Patriarch as that of the true
church. The separatist group, however, has continued to contest the
validity of the Patriarch's appointee in the United States. In 1945, the
New York legislature enacted N.Y. REL CoRu'. LAW §§ 105-108, which
as interpreted by the New York Court of Appeals, declared that all
churches formerly subject to the administration of the mother church in
Moscow, should be subsequently governed by the American separatist
movement.
Respondents claim the right to possession and use of the Cathedral
upon the strength of the rights conferred upon them by that statute. The
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New York Court of Appeals upheld this contention, St. Nicholas
Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America v. Kedroff,
302 N.Y. 1, 96 N.E.(2d) 56 (1950), declaring that though the statute
on its face appeared to be unconstitutional as an invasion by the civil
authority into church affairs, it was not so in fact. The court gave as
its reason the authority which it had to judicially recognize the condi-
tions which motivated the legislature in its action, namely, the recogni-
tion by the legislature of the present atheistic government in Russia and
the fact that the Russian Church was a mere arm of the Soviet govern-
ment. The court found that the legislature was justified in concluding
that the American faction could be relied upon to carry out more
effectively and faithfully the religious trust to which the church property
had been dedicated.
Holding itself to be bound by the interpretation given the statute by
the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court reversed, holding
that this attempt to pass ecclesiastical control from one church authority
to another was an unconstitutional interference into Church affairs, in
particular as prohibiting the free exercise of the ecclesiastical right of a
church to chose its own heirarchy. This decision of the Supreme Court
striking down legislative fiats interfering with religious liberty was merely
another in that long line of cases that has reaffirmed our national policy
of separation of Church and State as set forth in the First Amendment
and applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution. Cf., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
Having thus disposed of the effect of the statute in the case, by de-
claring it unconstitutional, the Court turned its attention to the merits
of the controversy. It adjudged that the appointee of the Russian Church
in Moscow was the proper person to occupy and use the cathedral on
the basis that the mother church was supreme in ecclesiastical matters.
This ground upon which the decision was rested brought into focus
again the question whether ecclesiastical adjudications by the supreme
authorities of heirarchial churches are final and binding upon civil
authorities even though such adjudications may involve rights to the
possession and use of church property.
The leading case on this subject is Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679,
(U.S. 1871) in which a controversy had arisen between two factions of
the Presbyterian Church in the United States over the right to the use
and possession of church property. In that case the discord which led to
the formation of the dissident faction arose over the issue of slavery.
The Court upheld the right of the group recognized and approved by the
General Assembly of the Church, that being the highest authority of the
Presbyterian Church in the United States at the time. The general rule
was set out by the court at 13 Wall. 727 as:
In this class of cases we think the rule of action which should govern
the civil courts, founded in a broad and sound view of the relations of
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church and state under our system of laws, and supported by a preponder-
ating weight of judicial authority is, that, whenever the questions of
discipline or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law have been decided
by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been
carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and binding
on them, in their application to the case before them.
This rule has been followed in the majority of jurisdictions, Shepard
v. Barkley, 247 U.S. 1 (1918) (see the numerous cases cited therein);
Russian-Serbian Holy Trinity Orthordox Church v. Kulik, 202 Minn,
560, 279 N.W. 364, 369 (1938); Trustees of Presbytery of New York
v. Westminister Presbyterian Church, 222 N.Y. 305, 118 N.E. 800, 802
(1918); however, a few have repudiated it altogether, Watson v. Gar-
vin, 54 Mo. 353 (1873); and attempts have been made to distinguish it,
for example, St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church of
North America v. Kedroff, 276 App. Div. 309, 94 N.Y.S.(2d) 453, 474
(1st Dep't 1950), upon such a variety of reasons that the leading author-
ity on American church law was led to comment that, "... this portion of
the law has become a perfect jungle, a wilderness of cases, a river of
doubt, and a despair to all concerned." ZOLLMAN, AmERICAN CHtmRcH
LAw 65 (1933).
Despite the wilderness, the broad outlines of the rules of law in the
field, both those followed by the majority and those of the minority are
capable of definition. Both the majority and minority recognize that
civil courts cannot interfere in strictly ecclesiastical controversies, be-
cause of their lack of jurisdiction under the American system of complete
separation of Church and State, Presbytery of Bismark v. Allen, 74 N.D.
400, 22 N.W.(2d) 625, 628 (1946). Civil courts are denied jurisdiction
in church matters because problems of doctrine and theology are too
difficult of comprehension and decision to permit the judges of a civil
court to become a final arbiter thereon. Moustakis v. Hellenic Orthodox
Soc., '261 Mass. 462, 159 N.E. 453 (1928).
Both majority and minority agree that civil courts can take juris-
diction over a controversy even though it involves ecclesiastical matters,
if and only if, the ecclesiastical determination will affect property rights.
In such cases, the matters of doctrine and theology or other purely
ecclesiastical problems are treated as incidental to the determination of
the property rights. First English Lutheran Church v. Evangelical Luth-
eran Synod, 135 F.(2d) 701, 703 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 757
(1943); Presbytery of Bismark v. Allen, supra, 22 N.W.(2d) at 631-32.
The main point of disagreement between the majority and minority
views in this problem is the binding effect and validity of ecclesiastical
adjucations in regard to the property rights. The majority maintains
that such determinations are not only binding on the courts, but that the
civil court is precluded from inquiring into even the essential validity of
them. Bouchelle v. Trustees of the Presbyterian Congregation, 22 Del.
58, 194 Atl. 100, 103 (Ch. 1937); Board of Trustees of Kansas Annual
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Conference of Church of United Brethren in Christ v. Mt. Carmel Com-
munity Cemetery Ass'n, 152 Kan. 243, 103 P.(2d) 877 (1940). The
minority, on the other hand, in effect limits the majority rule to non-
property cases and states that if property rights are concerned the
ecclesiastical authorities have no power whatsoever to adjudicate regard-
ing them. Ecclesiastical decisions are not only not binding, but their
propriety can be investigated. Watson v. Avery, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 332
(1867); Bear v. Heasley, 98 Mich. 279, 57 N.W. 270 (1893); Watson
v. Garvin, supra; Landrith v. Hudgins, 121 Tenn. 550, 120 S.W. 783,
815 (1907).
The minority rule in this country is the prevailing rule in England,
Craigdallie v. Aikman, 2 Bligh 529, 4 Eng. Rep. 435 (H.L. 1820),
though this is no doubt due to the position of ecclesiastical courts in that
country. But only one American court, in an early case, Smith v. Nelson,
18 Vt. 511 (1846), had not recognized the binding force of ecclesiastical
adjudications until the aforementioned controversy in the Presbyterian
Church produced the leading case of Watson v. Jones, supra, and the
first clear statement of the minority position, Watson v. Avery, supra,
and Watson v. Garvin, supra. There are varied reasons given in sub-
stantiation of the minority view: that ecclesiastical adjudications only
call for voluntary obedience and are not final or binding in a legal sense,
Smith v. Nelson, supra, 18 Vt. at 557-8; that the church should not have
the power to confiscate property without restraint, Watson v. Garvin,
supra, 54 Mo. at 368,381; and that in effect such a rule makes the will of
the assembly or tribunal the fundamental law and not that of the rules
of the church, Watson v. Avery, supra, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) at 349. The
few jurisdictions which follow the minority rule have weakened their
position by a lack of consistency in their application of it. For example,
in Missouri the case of Hayes v. Manning, 263 Mo. 1, 172 S.W. 897,
905 (1914) accepted the majority rule - but the latest lower court
decision reverted to the former minority holding. Murr v. Maxwell, 232
S.W.(2d) 219, 234-36 (Mo. App. 1950).
In addition to the strict minority rule as espoused by these few juris-
dictions, there are many courts which apply the general rule with slight
variations or exceptions, but agree in substance with the supremacy of
church decisions. The exceptions are based mainly on the consideration
of whether the civil court should accept ecclesiastical decisions as con-
clusive without being able to ascertain by any investigation deemed
necessary whether the tribunal was acting within its jurisdiction, i.e. in
accord with its procedures and organic laws - in short, the validity of
the tribunal itself. While the minority view deems this necessary and
proper, the majority rule, in its attempt to preserve Church-State separ-
ation, admits of no such investigation. However, the rule as enunciated
by the court in very broad language, seemingly would not exclude such
investigations in a proper case.
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These courts have attempted to distinguish the rule of Watson v.
Jones, supra, on the basis that the courts can interfere when it is mani-
festly obvious that there has been an abandonment of the tenets of the
church, and church action has been taken that is palpably erroneous and
in excess of the tribunal's jurisdiction. Mack v. Kime, 129 Ga. 1, 58 S.E.
184 (1907). Interference is also permitted where there is a possibility of
fraud, collusion or arbitrariness on the part of the church authorities,
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16
(1929); Turberville v. Morris, 203 S.C. 287, 26 S.E.(2d) 821, 828
(1943); or if the decisions are plainly violative of the civil law of the
state or the canons of the church, Canovaro v. Brothers of Order of
Hermits of St. Augustine, 326 Pa. 76, 191 AtI. 140, 146 (1937); Krecker
v. Shirey, 163 Pa. 534, 30 Atl. 440, 443 (1894); or in the obvious case
of ursurpers of the true authority, Bouldin v. Alexander, 15 Wall. 131
(U.S. 1872).
Further considerations are involved when the controversy involves a
schism within a heirarchial church, as in the instant case. In such cases,
the minority view, on the theory of an implied trust, holds that civil
courts are empowered to give the disputed property to the faction which
continues in harmony with the laws, usages and customs accepted by the
ecclesiastical body before the dispute arose. Nagle v. Miller, 120 Pa.
157, 118 Atl. 670 (1922). This view, however, is more properly applied
by courts where the controversy involves a schism in a congregational
church; and necessitates an inquiry into the internal affairs, doctrines
and beliefs of the church, in opposition to the majority rule. Mack v.
Kime, supra. The majority rule regards property that has been dedicated
to general church purposes or to the denomination, as belonging to the
church to be held in trust by the general church body and used in ac-
cordance with the decisions of the supreme church authorities. Kelly v.
Mclntire, 123 N.J. Eq. 351, 197 Atl. 736, 741 (Ch. 1938); Presbytery
of Bismark v. Allen, supra, 22 N.W.(2d) at 631. Their view is that, in
the case of a schism the property goes with the faction that is identical
with the original church. This is strictly a matter of identity and there
is no occasion to inquire into the religious opinions of those who com-
prise the legal and regular organization. The question is, which is the
true church. Those who adhere to, and are recognized by, the acknowl-
edged organization are entitled to the use of the property, whether
adhering or not to the doctrines originally professed. Such recognition
by the higher authorities of one of the factions is followed as binding on
the courts. Presbytery of Bismark v. Allen, supra, 22 N.W.(2d) at 629;
First Baptist Church of Paris v. Fort, 93 Tex. 215, 54 S.W. 892 (1900).
When the schism or controversy involves a dispute concerning the
highest church authorities, however, the majority rule is seemingly
rendered inapplicable because of the lack of a 'supreme recognized
authority which the courts can accept as a guide. This situation has led
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to a judicial holding that the majority rule does not apply in these cases,
Ramsey v. Hicks, 44 Ind. App. 490, 87 N.E. 1091 (1909), rev'd, 174
Ind. 428, 91 N.E. 344 (1910); and in White Lick Quarterly Meeting of
Friends v. White Lick Quarterly Meeting of Friends, 89 Ind. 136
(1883), the court made inquiry into the ecclesiastical law, usages and
customs to determine which of the conflicting groups should be recogn-
ized as the supreme authority. The general rule followed by the majority
of courts in such cases, however, has been to presume the validity and
regularity of the group which keeps the name and form of the original
'church as against the one that withdraws. Kedrovsky v. Rojdesvensky,
214 App. Div. 483, 212 N.Y. Supp. 273 (1st Dep't 1925), aff'd, 242 N.Y.
547, 152 N.E. 421 (1926).
Although the Court would not have been without precedent should it
have chosen to apply the minority rule in the instant case, in view of the
unique problems involved, its choice of the majority rule appears to have
been wisely made. This is especially true since both factions involved in
the controversy have, since 1945, recognized the Russian Patriarch as
the true Head of the Church. Under this circumstance the controversy
reduced itself, in the eyes of the court to an internal schism over admin-
istrative control, with a final authority recognized within the church
itself whose decisions in regard to ecclesiastical matters the courts must
accept as binding. The simplicity with which the Court seemingly dis-
posed of the problem points up the possibility that the New York Legis-
lature and the courts of that state, in placing too great emphasis upon
expediency and political and historical considerations had lost sight
of the more basic concept of church supremacy in church matters. The
reaffirmation of that concept by the highest court in the land seems to
have been very timely and should lay at rest any similar attempts to
circumvent or repudiate it.
Carl F. Eiberger, Jr.
CONFLICT OF LAW-s-DOMESTIC RELATIONs-FuLL FAITH AND CREDIT
-WHETHER SEPARATE MAINTENANCE ORDER IS MERGED BY SUBSE-
QUENT FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE.-Isserman v. Isserman, 11 N.J. 106,
93 A.(2d) 571 (1952). The plaintiff-appellant in this action, a married
woman, obtained a separate maintenance order from a New Jersey court
in 1927. Subsequently, in 1943, her husband, defendant-respondent, re-
ceived a divorce a vinculo in the courts of Nevada, the wife appearing
in this action both by counsel and personally. The decree of divorce in-
corporated a property settlement agreed to by the parties prior to the
action which was materially at variance with the original New Jersey
decree. The divorce decree also declared the former separate maintenance
order null and void. The wife later brought suit in a New Jersey court
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for the husband's failure to pay on the prior support order. The husband
petitioned the court to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the Nevada
divorce decree determined all the issues in the controversy and thus con-
stituted a bar to this action. From an adverse judgment the wife appealed.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that because there was a full
determination on both the marital status and the property rights by a
court having personal jurisdiction over both parties, the Nevada decree
of absolute divorce is a bar to any further litigation on these points. In
this respect the decision is clearly in line with the weight of authority in
the United States on this issue.
However, the court went on to say, 93 A.(2d) at 575:
This is subject to the exception that where there is a failure to apply in
the divorce proceeding for alimony in substitution for the support order
granted in the maintenance proceeding, this is merely a procedural defect
and the decree of divorce alone does not merge or vacate a prior order for
separate maintenance.
At first glance this dictum would seem to suggest a departure from the
established rules in this much litigated field. As might be expected, how-
ever, there is a logical explanation.
The questions of foreign divorce, the extent to which foreign decrees
are entitled to full faith and credit, the conflicts with the policy and
interests of the state and its domiciliaries, have been problems of great
magnitude for the courts to handle. The best known clarification and a
milestone in the subject was Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287
(1942), which overruled Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
The Williams case held that where a court has jurisdiction over one
domiciled in that state, a divorce from the absent spouse should be given
full faith and credit in a sister state provided the proper steps for notice
and service had been followed. From this holding, the rule logically
followed that if a court has jurisdiction over both of the parties, the
domicile of the complainant having been fully established, full faith and
credit should be given by a sister state to a decree destroying the marital
status.
The Williams case settled the rule in regard to the marital status.
But a new concept comes into view when a prior valid support and main-
tenance decree is involved. Here the state of original jurisdiction has an
additional interest. The concurring opinion in Esenwein v. Common-
wealth, 325 U.S. 279, 282 (1945), stated that although state policy must
give way to the larger federal interests, still the state of domicile of the
wife has a deep concern over the family and its future support, and the
courts should see that wives and children do not become wards of the
state. Therefore, it appears that a closer scrutiny must be given to a
judgment of a sister state when a prior separation and maintenace decree
is involved.
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The case of Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948), sheds further light
on the issue at hand. In that case, the Supreme Court adopted the doc-
trine of "divisble divorce," whereby the marital status is dissolved but
the obligation of support subsists. The Court required that full faith and
credit be given to the Nevada decree as regards the severance of the
matrimonial bonds, however, because of the lack of personal jurisdiction
over the wife and the failure of the Nevada court to mention the issue of
alimony in its decree, the prior separation and maintenance order of the
New York court was not affected by this decree and remained valid and
subsisting. This ruling was based on the fact that the New York decree
of separate maintenance was a property decree of that state and the wife
never permitted her property rights to be embraced by a Nevada juris-
diction.
A subsequent New York case is closer to the point in ques.tion here.
In Lynn v. Lynn, 302 N.Y. 193, 97 N.E.(2d) 748 (1951), there was
personal jurisdiction over both of the parties. A prior separation and
maintenance order was in existence and a Nevada court rendered its
decree of divorce a vinculo without mention of this order nor the ques-
tion of alimony. The Court of Appeals of New York held that the rights
of the parties had been completely- adjudicated in this actioh and, in
giving full faith and credit to this decree, it could not regard the prior
separation and maintenance order as still in existence. The court rea-
soned that as there was personal jurisdiction over both of the parties, all
the rights connected with the marital relationship were adjudicated and
this terminated the separation decree.
As a result, it is to be noted that if there is not personal jurisdiction
over both of the parties, the courts of a sister state will give full faith and
credit to the decree as dissolving the marital status, but will not allow the
foreign decree to abolish the prior separate maintenance decree. How-
ever, when there is personal jurisdiction over both of the parties, full
faith and credit will be given to an adjudication of all the incidents of
the marriage, including the prior separation decree, whether or not it is
mentioned in the decree of divorce.
It seems therefore, that the statement made by the New Jersey court,
quoted above, is in conflict with these principles. How are the two to be
reconciled? Is this a contrary decision adding confusion to the field?
The answer lies in N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2:50-37 (1939) which provides:
... after decree of divorce, whether obtained in this State or elsewhere,
the Court of Chancery may make such order touching the alimony of the
wife ...as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case
shall render fit, reasonable and just....
The court, it is evident, founded its statement upon this statute and
therefore a vital distinction can be made between the decision in the
instant case and others based upon case law. This statute gives the court
the power in a case where neither the prior separate maintenance order
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
nor alimony is mentioned in the divorce decree, to consider the separa-
tion order as valid and subsisting if the justice of the case so demands.
In addition to furnishing the point of distinction for the dictum in this
case, the New Jersey statute might also well be considered by the legis-
lators of other states as a solution to the difficulty and inequity which
follows a foreign divorce decree where the parties have, possibly through
inadvertence, failed to make provision for alimony or maintenance.
Donald W. Bebenek.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - LOYALTY OATH STATUTE - SCIENTER. -
Wieman v. Updegraff, -U.S ....., 73 S.Ct. 215 (1952). Appellee, Upde-
graff, brought suit as a citizen and taxpayer in the District Court of Okla-
homa County to enjoin the necessary state officials from making further
salary payments to appellants, members of the faculty and staff of
Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College, who had not submitted
to a loyalty oath prescribed by Oklahoma statute for all state officers
and employees. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 37.2 (1951).
The portion of the oath objected to by appellants would have had
them swear that within five years immediately preceding the taking of
the oath, they had not been members of any group or organization which
had been officially determined by the United States Attorney General or
other authorized public agency of the United States to be a Communist-
front or subversive organization. The appellants, who were permitted to
intervene, attacked the validity of the Act on the grounds, among others,
that it was "a bill of attainer; an ex post facto law; impaired the obliga-
tion of their contracts with the State and violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." The court upheld the Act and
enjoined the state officers from making further salary payments to
appellants.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed, Board of Regents v. Upde-
grafi, 205 Okla. 301, 237 P.(2d) 131 (1951), and the Supreme Court of
the United States noted probable jurisdiction because of the "public
importance of this type of legislation and the recurring serious constitu-
tional questions which it presents." The judgment was reversed and the
statute declared violative of due process because it indiscriminately
classified innocent and knowing association or membership together.
In Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), the Court held that
the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp. 1952), requires as an essential
element of the crime, proof of the intent of those who are charged with
its violation to overthrow the Government by force and violence. Three
other recent cases have declared the constitutionality of statutes re-
quiring loyalty oaths to hinge upon their differentiating between "join-
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ers" who had knowledge of organizational purposes, and those who had
innocently joined organizations, which the Attorney General later
designated as subversive or as a Communist-front.
In Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952), the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Feinberg Law, N.Y. EDUCA-
TION LAW § 3022, which provides that membership in any organization
listed as advocating the overthrow of the government by force, violence
or other unlawful means would be prima facie evidence of disqualification
for employment in the public schools. The Supreme Court noted that the
New York courts had construed the statute to require knowledge of
organizational purpose before the regulation would apply.
The case of Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951),
considered a Los Angeles city ordinance which required every employee
to take an oath that, within a five year period prior to the enactment of
the ordinance, he had neither been a member nor affiliated with disloyal
groups which advocated the violent overthrow of the Government. The
employees also had to execute an affidavit as to their membership in the
Communist Party at any time. In this case, though the oath was similar
to the one to be taken in Oklahoma, insofar as it did not require scienter
expressly, the Court called attention to the fact that in People v. Steelik,
187 Cal. 361, 203 Pac. 78, 84 (1921), the Supreme Court of California
had interpreted a criminal syndicalism statute so as to require knowledge
of the character of the proscribed organization as of the time of affilia-
tion. Accordingly, scienter was assumed to be implicit in each clause of
the subversive oath, and it was held constitutional.
Finally, in Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951), an
appeal was taken from a decision of the Court of Appeals of the State of
Maryland, the effect of which was to deny the appellant a place on the
ballot for a municipal election because of her refusal to file an affidavit
required by state law. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 85A, § 15
(1952). Upon receiving assurance from the Maryland Attorney General
that the affiant could make knowledge of organizational purpose a con-
dition in the oath, the Supreme Court declared the statute valid.
These cases, in varying degrees, have made scienter a requisite to the
constitutionality of the oaths which they consider. On this ground, at
least, there is uniformity in the loyalty oath cases. However, beyond
this element, it is difficult to find the clarity one might desire.
Among the first cases to reach the courts on this problem of test oaths
were those dealing with statements of loyalty to the Union, made manda-
tory for certain specified occupations and activities after the Civil War.
In these cases, the courts held that such oaths were unconstitutional
where they were made prerequisite to offices or occupations which men
have as natural or inalienable right or liberty or as a civil right; e.g.,
teaching, State v. Heighland, 41 Mo. 388 (1867); performing priestly
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duties, Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (U.S. 1867); practicing as
an attorney before the courts, Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U.S.
1867); seeking rehearing in litigation, Pierce v. Carskadon, 16 Wall.
234 (U.S. 1873). These oaths operated as bills of attainder, punishing
without trial through a deprivation of rights. On the other hand, such
oaths were declared constitutional when they merely prescribed certain
conditions or qualifications, which, when complied with, would enable
one to exercise a privilege or franchise and did not interfere with a
"natural right." Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 63 (1867) (privilege of
voting).
This distinction made on the basis of the nature of the office or occu-
pation has been continued in the recent cases. Garner v. Board of Public
Works, supra, held that public employment is a privilege conferred by
the state, and is therefore subject to the reasonable qualifications and re-
quirements laid down by the state. This same conclusion was reached,
in effect, in Steiner v. Darby, 88 Cal. App.(2d) 481, 199 P.(2d) 429
(1948), cert. granted, 337 U.S. 929, cert. dismissed, 338 U.S. 327
(1949), which held that county employees, as employees of the govern-
ment, have foregone any privilege they may have had as private citizens
to advocate the overthrow of the government. Therefore, a loyalty oath
and affidavit containing among other things a denial of present or ante-
cedent affiliation with any subversive group, was not unconstitutional.
This line of distinction as to what constitutes a bill of attainder be-
cause interfering with a natural as opposed to a civil activity or occupa-
tion has not remained clear however. In Tolman v. Underhill, 229 P.(2d)
447 (Cal. App. 1951), the court held that a group of faculty members
of the University of California could not be deprived of their positions
for failure to swear to a loyalty oath prescribed by the regents of the
university. This conclusion was reached on the basis of a constitutional
provision which prescribed the form of oath to be taken by civil officials
and provided that no other oath, declaration or test be required as a
qualification for any office or public trust. CAL. CONST. Art. XX, § 3.
Thus the civil nature of the employment served in this case as a safe-
guard rather than as a reason for greater severity.
Because of the powerful position of labor unions and the danger in
interstate commerce from possible political strikes, the Supreme Court
in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), held
that -it was- not unconstitutional to require officials of unions to file
declarations of loyalty (non-Communist affidavits), or to penalize their
organizations by depriving them of certain provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 141
(Supp. 1952), for their failure or refusal to do so. This was not a bill of
attainder as it did not punish for past acts, but was only intended to
prevent future action, and a union official could obtain the benefits for
his organization by merely changing his relationship with those deemed
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disloyal. These cases illustrate the fact that the line of distinction be-
tween civil offices or other privileges, and vocations or occupations fol-
lowed as a natural right, is not adequate to meet all the possible
situations. The courts have not, and probably in the future will not,
hesitate to disregard this distinction where necessary.
Nor is there a great amount of certainty as to when a loyalty oath is
unconstitutional as being ex post facto. Some of the oaths explicitly
state their present and future operation, thereby avoiding any possibility
of confusion, Dworken v. Cleveland Board of Education, 94 N.E.(2d)
18 (1950), aff'd, 108 N.E.(2d) 103, appeal dismissed, 156 Ohio St. 346,
102 N.E.(2d) 253 (1951). See also, American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, supra. Others do operate retrospectively such as the oath con-
sidered in Garner v. Board of Public Works, supra, 341 U.S. at 721.
However, the ordinance prescribing the oath in that case had been pre-
ceded in 1941 by an amendment to the city charter providing for an
oath of loyalty. Since the ordinance did not extend beyond the date on
which the change in the charter had been effected, it was not ex post
facto.
In the instant case there was no need for passing on the retrospective
element of the oath in question, since the failure to include scienter was
a conclusive defect. The question however presents itself as to what
would have been the effect of the retroactive functioning of the oath, had
the problem of scienter not been present.
The decision in the instant case, while it presents no new direction for
loyalty oath cases, does serve to strengthen the United States Supreme
Court's previous refusal to allow the uncertainty of the "cold war" to
interfere with the traditional concept of knowledge as a necessary ele-
ment of any form of guilt. It is to be hoped that the problems and
ambiguities which still exist concerning the extent to which loyalty oaths
may be constitutionally required and the types of activity and occupa-
tion which fall within their restrictions, will be dealt with as clearly and
with as ardent a desire for the preservation of liberty.
Walter C. Clements.
CORPORATIONS - DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS - STANDARD OF CARE IN
CONDUCTING CORPORATION AFFAIRS. - New York Credit Men's Ad-
justment Bureau, Inc. v. Weiss, 305 N.Y. 1, 110 N.E.(2d) 397 (1953).
The defendants, as directors, officers, and sole stockholders of the W. F.
Irish Co., being unable to obtain additional funds by loans or other
means decided it was impossible to continue business any longer. The
corporation had on its balance sheet an estimated inventory of $73,-
492.21 on December 31, 1948. The cost value as inventoried on February
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4, 1949, was at least $60,000.00. There were bills outstanding of $52,-
000.00. The defendants chose to liquidate the corporate assets through
a public auction sale and obtained an auctioneer for this purpose and
turned the assets over to him. He advertised the liquidation auction in
the normal manner for a sale of this type, but the creditors of the
corporation were not specifically notified. The net proceeds of the sale
were $19,866.98. Shortly after this sale the creditors petitioned the
corporation into involuntary bankruptcy. The creditors of the corpora-
tion, represented by the trustee in bankruptcy, then sued the directors
for waste of the corporations assets under § 60(2) of the New York
General Corporation Law.
The Supreme Court of New York entered a judgment in favor of the
defendants and dismissed the complaint on its merits. The Appellate
Division, New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Weiss,
278 App. Div. 501, 105 N.Y.S. (2d) 604 (1st Dep't 1951), reversed and
ordered a new trial solely for determining damages. The Court of Ap-
peals upheld the decision of the Appellate Division and placed the
burden upon the defendants to show that the sale was not an improper
and improvident depletion of the assets occasioned through neglect or
failure to perform their fiduciary duties.
The case raised the problem of the degree of care required of an
officer or director of a corporation in carrying on the affairs of the
corporation. The opinion of the majority of the court followed the old
and well established standard of the New York courts; the director is
required to use that amount of care and prudence that he would use in
running his own affairs. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.(2d) 2, 5 (Sup. Ct.
1944); Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (37 Sickels 1880). This view is op-
posed by the rule that the care required is only that of any reasonably
prudent corporation officer or director conducting the affairs of his
corporation under similar circumstances, Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S.
132, 152 (1891); Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.(2d) 883 (6th Cir. 1938);
Anderson v. Bundy, 161 Va. 1, 171 S.E. 501, 507 (1933).
It must be recognized that these two opposite views are both well
founded on reasonable principles. The New York rule is based on the
security of the investor, creditor or depositor of a corporation or bank.
If the directors were not to be held liable for a great degree of care, the
money placed in their hands would be insecure. Such insecurity is
diminshed by requiring the directors to exercise the same degree of care
they would use in their own affairs, Hun v. Cary, supra, 82 N.Y. at 71,
and the creditors should be more willing to let their money be used.
However, while security is an essential element it is not the only one to
be considered. The strictness of the New York rule would seem to make
it more difficult to obtain the better, more responsible men for positions
as directors and officers. If the conduct of a director is to be judged by
such a strict standard, equivalent to that required of an agent or trustee
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of a private estate, as stated in Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 21 (1872),
"... no gentlemen of character and responsibility would be found willing
to accept such places." While this may have been an exaggeration of the
situation it does point out the problem.
To require of a director the care which any reasonably prudent director
or officer under similar circumstances would exercise is the rule adopted
by the codifiers of the Model Business Corporations Act, § 33, 9
UNIFORm LAWs ANN. 118 (1951). This rule, stated to be the majority
and preferable one, sets a uniform standard for all men in the same
business and is followed by statute in several states. IDAHO CODE ANN. §
30-142 (1948); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271.365 (Baldwin Cum. Supp.
1953); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:36 (West 1950); MIcH. STAT. ANN.
§ 21.47 (Cum. Supp. 1951); WASH. REv. CODE § 23.60.080 (1951).
Several treatises also support this view. BALLANTINE, COm'ORATIONS §
63 (Rev. ed. 1946); 2 THOMPSON, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1410 (2d
ed. 1909). This standard gives a directive which is not only less strict
than the first but is also more uniform. The creditors and depositors are
able to depend on this uniformity in all their dealings with any corpora-
tion and thereby gain the security they desire. At the same time able
business men are given a measuring stick of conduct so they need not
fear entering the field as directors or officers.
The majority of the court in holding that the directors failed in the
performance of their fiduciary duty support the strict view. It is clear
that the defendants were free to sell the assets as they did and were
violating no law in so doing. There were other options open to them, such
as the bankruptcy proceedings, but they were not bound to use them.
Recognizing this, the court still held, in view of the heavy loss at the
auction sale and the failure of the defendants to notify their creditors of
the sale, that they had violated their fiduciary duty as directors by not
exercising the required degree of care. It appeared clear to the court
that the failure to supervise or conduct the liquidation auction, coupled
with the failure to notify the creditors, was not carrying on the business
as they would have carried on their own affairs. The court pointed out
that the failure to conduct or supervise the auction was not in itself so
much the breach of the duty as was the very choosing of the auction
as the means of disposing of the assets. By choosing the auction, the
defendants failed to meet the standard of care necessary. For these rea-
sons the court reversed the normal procedure and placed on the defend-
ants the burden of proving that they had not wasted the assets of the
corporation. Accord, BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 63b (Rev. ed.
1946).
In view of the New York rule, the majority decision would seem to be
acceptable. It does, however, leave room for dispute in its attempt to set
out a clear line of division between negligence and mistake of judgment.
The dissent takes the view that their acts were a mistake of judgment
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and that there is no liability for a mistake of judgment, Briggs v.
Spaulding, supra. The dissent by bringing up the matter of mistake
of judgment vividly points out the conflict between the two standards
of care discussed above. It is impossible to simply state that where
the amount of loss is great there was negligence and where it was
small there was a mistake of judgment. All the facts must be weighed
and carefully considered. The directors, by acting as others in the same
situation had acted, were, under the strict rule, liable for negligence in
conducting the affairs of the corporation. Under the liberal view they
would at the most have been guilty of a mistake in their judgment. The
very same acts and decisions bring about diametrical results.
While it is not probable that either is the ultimate solution, the liberal
view is more conducive to a just solution to this problem. In the absence
of such outstanding deciding elements as fraud or deceit, the court's
majority view works a grave hardship on directors of a corporation in
situations similar to the one in the principle case. By observing the
actions of others and making their decisions thereon the directors sought
to make the right decision. In so doing, practically any means they might
have chosen, that lost a great amount of money, would have fallen short
of the degree of care used by a man in his own business affairs. Consider-
ing these factors it seems clear why a majority of the authorities support
the liberal view.
Robert J. Hepler.
EMINENT DOMAIN - VIOLATION OF ZONING RESTRICTIONS BY
MuNIciPALITY - NECESSITY OF COMPENSATION. - McKinney v. City
of High Point, 237 N.C. 66, 74 S.E.(2d) 440 (1953). The defendant
city purchased a lot across the street from plaintiff's home, in a district
zoned by its own ordinances as "Residence 'A' District" wherein only
dwelling houses were permitted. It proceeded to build a water tank
thereon which, when completed, rose 184 feet above the ground. Ordi-
nances also provided that no public building should be more than sixty
feet high. The plaintiff brought an action alleging, inter alia, that the
construction and operation of the tank constituted actionable negligence,
that the water tank had cheapened plaintiff's property and constituted
an unlawful appropriation, that the tank was a nuisance, and that the
present use of the property by the city had violated the ordinance and
had defeated the purpose for which the district was zoned.
The city demurred on the grounds generally, that there was no such
invasion as would constitute a physical taking of plaintiff's property or
property rights and that the city performed a governmental function by
supplying water and was therefore immune to any tort liability. The
lower court overruled the demurrer, and on appeal the Supreme Court
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of North Carolina modified the lower court's ruling by denying liability
wherever the cause of action appeared in tort, but affirmed it insofar as
the allegations showed damages from a taking of private property for
public use. While the court held that zoning ordinances did not apply to
a city performing governmental functions, it pointed out that govern-
mental immunity did not extend to the taking of property interests
without compensation to the owners of the property.
This decision was based upon the recent case of City of Raleigh v.
Edwards, 235 N.C. 671, 71 S.E.(2d) 396 (1952), where, treating the
matter for the first time, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that
negative easements, created by covenants restricting the use of property,
constituted a vested interest in land for which compensation must be
paid when the property is condemned. See Note, 31 N.C.L. REv. 125
(1952). The decision in the instant case differs only in the respect that
the plaintiff's property rights, in the form of an equitable or negative
easement, arose from the zoning ordinance instead of a private restrictive
covenant. Although the defendant city, acting in the interest of public
health and safety, had a right to erect the water tank, it was bound to
pay compensation for any damage to the plaintiff's property interests,
and not to do so would be a breach of the provisions of the state and
federal constitutions.
The property rights arising from restrictions on the use of land
generally find their basis in conveyance. CLARK PRMCIPLEs oF EQuITY
§ 96 (1937). Historically, the finding that restrictions on the use of land
create an equitable property interest has its source in the case of Tulk v.
Moxhay, 2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848), and the classifica-
tion of such an interest as property in the cases of In re Nisbet & Potts'
Contract, [1905 1 Ch. 391, 399, aff'd, [1906] 1 Ch. 386, 395-6; The
Long Eaton Co. v. Midland Ry., [1902] 2 K.B. 574. In this country
the recognition of the equitable easement as a property right has not
gone unchallenged. Each case to be considered in this discussion involves
the acquisition by eminent domain and a denial or affirmation of the
existence of a property right in the form of an easement.
Those jurisdictions which do not follow the English courts do not
admit the existence of a property right, or if they do admit it, hold the
right void as against the acquiring agency. The case most relied on in
accord with this view is United States v. Certain Lands, 112 Fed. 622
(C.C.D.R.I. 1899), aff'd sub nor. Wharton v. United States, 153 Fed.
876 (1st Cir. 1907). Here, the land was taken by the government for
coastal defense purposes. Some parcels were subject to covenants pro-
hibiting certain uses, including among others, any trade or business
which was noxious, dangerous or offensive. The court held that the use
for which the land was acquired was not contrary to the restrictive
covenant. The decision, however, did not stop there, but went on to say,
112 Fed. at 629:
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
While the owners may so contract as to control private business, and
thereby increase the values of their estates, they are not entitled so to
contract as to control the action of the government .... Each land owner
holds his estate subject to the public necessity for the exercise of the right
of eminent domain for public purposes. He cannot evade this by any
agreement with his neighbor, nor can his neighbor acquire a right from a
private individtal which imposes a new burden upon the public in the
exercise of the right of eminent domain.
On error to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Wharton
v. United States, 153 Fed. 876 (1st Cir. 1907), the decision was affirmed.
As regards the vested property interests claimed by the complainants,
the court stated, 153 Fed. at 878, that such rights re mere contractual
provisions "often incorrectly spoken of as negative easements. . . . If
they were in fact easements, they would constitute true hereditaments,
and the plaintiff in error would be entitled to the allowance of damages
even if nominal."
Cases in accord with this view and holding such restrictive covenants
void as against the acquiring agency are: Moses v. Hazen, 69 F.(2d)
842 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Friesen v. City of Glendale, 209 Cal. 524, 288
Pac. 1080 (1930) (see criticism in 19 CALIF. L. REv. 58 (1930); Ander-
son v. Lynch, 188 Ga. 154, 3 S.E.(2d) 85 (1939); Doan v. Cleveland
Short Line Ry., 92 Ohio St. 461, 112 N.E. 505 (1915); City of Houston
v. Wynne, 279 S.W. 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925), afl'd, 115 Tex. 255, 281
S.W. 544 (1926).
Those jurisdictions which grant compensation to the property owner
when land subject to restrictive covenants is taken by eminent domain
proceedings maintain that they are the majority. This appears to be
correct since, not counting one recent federal case, United States v.
Certain Land, 49 F. Supp. 265 (E.D.N.Y. 1943), where the issue was
termed too "serious" to be disposed of on a motion to intervene, there are
eight, possibly nine, jurisdictions which hold that restrictions upon the
use of land create a vested property interest for the taking of which
compensation is necessary.
The most frequently cited case in the majority group is Town of
Stamford v. Vuono, 108 Conn. 359, 143 Ati. 245 (1928), where it was
held that property owners in a restricted residential area were entitled
to compensation on the ground that the restrictive covenants created a
vested interest in land in the nature of an easement, which interest was
taken when the municipality built a school adjacent to their lands.
Accord: Massachusetts, Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Chadwick, 228
Mass. 242, 117 N.E. 244 (1917); Ladd v. City of Boston, 151 Mass.
585, 24 N.E. 858 (1890); Michigan, Johnstone v. Detroit G. H. & M.
Ry., 245 Mich. 65, 222 N.W. 324 (1928); Minnesota, Klaproth v.
Griniger, 162 Minn. 488, 203 N.W. 418 (1925); Missouri, Peters v.
Buckner, 288 Mo. 618, 232 S.W. 1024 (1921); North Carolina, City of
Raleigh v. Edwards, supra; New Jersey, Hayes v. Waverly & P. R.R.,
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51 N.J. Eq. 345, 27 Ad. 648 (Ch. 1893) (But cf. Herr v. Board of
Education, 82 N.J.L. 610, 83 Ad. 173 (1912); New York, Flynn v. New
York W. & B. Ry., 218 N.Y. 140, 112 N.E. 913 (1916); Wisconsin,
Fuller v. Town Board, 193 Wis. 549, 214N.W. 324 (1927) semble. Inthis
last case, an award of compensation had already been made to adjoining
land owners for their losses occasioned by the violation of the restrictive
covenant. Although the court recognized that the interest which they had
in the maintenance of the restriction was a property right, and refused
to disturb the town board's action because of the awards made, it gave
no official approbation, declaring rather that a decision on the right of
adjoining owners to compensation was not necessary to the solution of
the case.
Public policy, which governs certain portions of the reasoning on both
sides of the issue, seems to weigh more in favor of the private land owner.
It appears that the underlying rationale in at least three states expressing
the view of the minority is the fear of multitudinous claims against the
acquiring agency. Friesen v. City of Glendale, supra, 288 Pac. at 1083;
Anderson v. Lynch, supra, 3 S.E.(2d) at 88-89; City of Houston'v.
Wynne, supra, 279 S.W. at 919.
A complete discussion of the minority views and a concise criticism
thereof is presented by Aigler, Measure of Compensation for Extinguish-
ment of an Easement by Condemnation, [1945] Wis. L. REv. 1. It is sub-
mitted that the reliance placed in the security and benefit of land pur-
chased in a residential district, and the purpose of zoning as related to
the public welfare, should constitute a stronger argument for the inter-
ests of the restricted property owner. The weight given such a restrictive
zoning ordinance in the instant case is emphasized by the fact that the
purpose of the zoning ordinance is the protection of a particular class of
persons and not for the benefit of the community as a whole. That the
right of action flows from a restrictive zoning ordinance as well as from
a restrictive private covenant is wholly proper considering the basic
principles underlying the zoning of property to particular uses. Sapiro v.
Frisbie, 93 Cal. App. 299, 270 Pac. 280, 282 (1928).
The nearness of such a structure as a 184 foot water tank to the
plaintiff's residence may reasonably be expected to reduce the value of
his estate. The operation of the rule that such an owner has a negative
easement and thus a compensable property interest will provide for such
a loss. Other nearby owners need not suffer a loss of value where it can
be shown that, from increased water pressure, reduced fire hazard, and
other public benefits, their property actually increased in value from the
operation of the water tank. The erection of a public school in a resi-
dential neighborhood would have the same effects - injuring the
pecuniary evaluation of the property of the immediately adjacent
dwellers, and benefiting others in the area.
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Therefore, the possibility of multitudinous claims, which is the under-
lying rationale of the minority view, is not impressive when the court
may dismiss more distant claims on the basis of increased, rather than
decreased, value and benefits to those claimants from the uses made of
the property by the city. Tested in the light of practical considerations,
the majority view would appear to be the better solution to this problem
and the decision of the court in the instant case awarding recovery to a
resident whose house was shadowed by the water tank and blinded by
the glare from its silver sides was correct.
Norman H. McNeil.
ESCHEAT - EVIDENCE - EXTENT OF PROOF REQUIRED. - State v.
Otis Elevator Co., 10 N.J. 504, 92 A.(2d) 385 (1952). The State of New
Jersey in 1949 brought proceedings against the defendant corporation to
escheat personal property being held by the corporation, consisting of
registered corporate stock and the accrued dividends thereon, which had
remained unclaimed for a period of forty years. One Abraham Grenthal,
who was the substituted receiver of J. B. Skehan & Co., entered the pro-
ceeding, also as a defendant, claiming ownership of the stock and
dividends through an assignment by the original owner to his predeces-
sor. The evidence which he offered in support of his contention con-
sisted of (1) a letter, dated October 20, 1909 written by the original
owner and addressed to the Otis Elevator Company in which he advised
the company that he had assigned the stock shares to the receiver of
the J. B. Skehan & Company; and (2) an item in a newspaper at about
the same time which contained an account of a transfer and sale of
stocks between two companies, there being a possibility that the stocks
mentioned could have included the certificate in question in the instant
case.
Grenthal offered no evidence that the stock certificate had ever been
delivered to the original receiver, nor was he able to produce it at the
time of the escheat proceedings. The lower court found that Grenthal
had no valid claim and adjudged that the property had escheated to the
state. In affirming this judgment, the Supreme Court stated that what
Grenthal had offered as evidence in support of his claim failed to meet
the qualification of competent evidence clearly establishing his con-
tention.
The issue in the case, as suggested by the dissenting opinion, was
whether he should have been required to establish his claim only by a
preponderance of the evidence or whether clear and convincing proof
was necessary.
The majority opinion was apparently based on the requirements of
proof in connection with lost instruments, which place the burden on the
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claimant of showing his right by evidence which is clear and convincing,
Superior Oil Co. v. Harsh, 39 F. Supp. 467 (E.D.Ill. 1941), aff'd, 126
F.(2d) 572 (7th Cir. 1942); Union Baptist Church of Mobile v. Roper,
181 Ala. 297, 61 So. 288 (1913); JA.B. Holding Co. v. Nathan, 118
N.J. Eq. 382, 179 Adt. 457 (Ch. 1935), rev'd on other grounds, 120 N.J.
Eq. 340, 184 Atl. 829 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936): clear and certain, Keniff
v. Caulfield, 140 Cal. 34, 73 Pac. 803 (1903): clear and satisfactory, In
re Nicholls, 190 Pa. 308,42 Atl. 692 (1899).
The "clear and convincing" proof requirements have been applied by
other courts in cases of escheats. In re Seddon's Estate, 110 Colo. 528,
136 P.(2d) 285 (1943). In that case, the petitioners, attempting to pre-
vent the escheat, claimed to be heirs of the decedent whose estate was
involved. As proof of their kinship they offered (1) pages from an
English city directory showing that a women whom they alleged was their
grandmother had been listed at the same address as the decedent's father
at one time; and (2) oral testimony regarding statements by their father
that he was an illegitimate child, coupled with some English birth
records which indicated that an illegitimate child had been born at about
the same time to the woman who might have been the sister of the
decedent's father. The court found their claim of kinship to be rested
upon conjectural surmises and ingenious inferences, pointing out, 136
P.(2d) at 287, that the petitioners,
... have the burden of proving their relationship to the decedent as a
prerequisite to securing such property. . . . "The evidence must be clear
and convincing and consist of more than mere conjecture."
In a Michigan case involving a similar issue of proof of kinship to
prevent the escheat of an estate, the court found that the petitioners had
clearly established satisfactory proof. In re Wright's Estate, 268 Mich.
586, 256 N.W. 557 (1934). The proofs offered in that case consisted of
letters written by the deceased, Bible entries, proof of personal visits,
certified copies of records and documents, all of which were substantiated
to a large extent by public records.
Where third persons intervene in an escheat proceeding, as claimants
against both the state and the defendant, which is the parallel of the
instant case, it has been held that the burden of proof upon such claim-
ants is to establish their title to a legal certainty. Succession of Town-
send, 40 La. Ann. 66, 3 So. 488 (1887). It was necessary for the inter-
venors in this case to show that the deceased woman was actually their
long missing relative. As proof of this fact they offered oral and written
testimony to show a similarity of features, characteristics and habits, as
well as the coincidence of the time and circumstances under which the
missing relative had disappeared and the deceased woman had appeared.
Both the majority and the dissenting opinions in the case agreed that
the claimants had the burden of proving their heirship "with reasonable
certainty," but disagreed as to the weight to be given the evidence.
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In the instant case, the minority opinion reasoned that the claimant
in an escheat proceeding "should be required to establish his claim only
by a preponderance of the evidence and not by clear and convincing
proof." 92 A.(2d) at 390. This position is supported by legal writers.
9 WI ~xon, EVIDENc E § 2498 (3d ed. 1940).
There is also case authority so holding, Watterson v. Tremaine, 24
N.Y.S. (2d) 830 (Sup. Ct. 1941), referred to by the dissent in the instant
case. The petitioner in this escheat proceeding showed by oral testimony
that she was the niece of the deceased whose bank account was the sub-
ject of the action. Her evidence showed that she had lived with the
deceased for over twenty years, was completely familiar with his hand-
writing, that she had an accurate and intimate knowledge of his family
and pedigree and that the signature in the deposit book was clearly that
of her deceased uncle. Her testimony was unchallenged and no contrary
proof was ever offered. The court ruled that she had not only proved hei
claim by a fair preponderance of the evidence, but had gone even farthei
than she was required.
In re Link's Estate, 319 Pa. 513, 180 At. 1, 2 (1935), where the
claimants, who had lived in Germany, endeavored to prove by ex parte
affidavits that they were cousins of the decedent, the court affirmed the
lower court's ruling for the state, and stated that "the burden rested
upon appellants to prove their claim by a fair preponderance of trust-
worthy and satisfying evidence, as in civil cases." However, the court
went on to state, 180 At. at 5:
The evidence must be grounded on a reasonable certainty and come from
witnesses whose truth and candor are not questioned. To defeat the claim
of the commonwealth, the evidence must be so clear, precise, and definite
in quality and quantity as to satisfy the court below that the relationship
claimed existed.
Here, in one case, are to be found both the conflicting views on this
subject of the extent of the proof required of a claimant in an escheat
proceeding.
While it cannot be denied that this conflict will remain an important
element in the choice of instructions for a jury, a study of the factual
situations involved in the few decided cases indicates that the distinction
has not generally presented any serious problem of substantive rights,
since the evidence adduced has been clearly sufficient or insufficient
under either doctrine. The instant case, however, has probably come
nearer to presenting the problem squarely on this issue than any other.
When viewed under the circumstances of this case, the reasoning offered
by the dissenting Justices seems to present the better solution to the
problem. It is difficult to find a good reason why an escheat proceeding
should be subjected to a more stringent rule regarding burden of proof
than any other civil action.
John P. Coyne.
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LABOR RELATIONS - UNION UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE - FEATHiER-
BEDDING. - American Newspaper Pub. Ass'n v. NLRB, .-. U.S ....., 73
S.Ct. 552 (1953). The International Typographical Union (ITU) de-
riianded that newspaper publishers, upon using advertising mats as molds
for metal castings from which to print advertisements, pay printers at
regular rates, for setting up duplicate forms for such advertisements in
the same manner, though the duplicate mats were not used. The pub-
lishers association contended that such activity on the part of the union
was a violation of § 8(b) (6) of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947, 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (6) (Supp. 1952).
The National Labor Relations Board dismissed the "featherbedding"
charges against the union, and its order was upheld by a United States
Court of Appeals. American Newspaper Pub. Ass'n v. NLRB, 193
F.(2d) 782, 801-2 (7th Cir. 1951). The Supreme Court affirmed this
decision, holding that the insistence by the ITU that printers be paid for
producing advertising matter for which publishers ordinarily have no
use was not an unfair labor practice within the anti-featherbedding pro-
vision of the Labor Management Relations Act because the union sought
payment for work actually done and not for work not performed or not
to be performed.
Section 8(b) (6) makes it an unfair labor practice on the part of a
union:
... to cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to
pay or deliver any money or other thing of value, in the nature of an
exaction, for services which are not performed or not to be performed.
A provision of similar import, § 506(a) of the Communications
Act, 48 STAT. 1064 (1934) as amended, 60 STAT. 89, 47 U.S.C. § 506
(1946), was upheld as constitutional in United States v. Petrillo, 332
U.S. 1 (1947). The language of that statute makes it a criminal offense
to wilfully coerce another to employ workers not needed by the em-
ployer. By analogy, the Court might have reasonably concluded that to
require an employer to pay for the resetting of type that is never to be
used by him is nothing more than make-work activity, and as such pro-
hibited as an unfair labor practice within the anti-featherbedding pro-
visions of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.
The Court chose, however, in the instant case, to apply a strict and
literal interpretation to the provision and found that the union's in-
sistence that its members be paid for duplicating advertising forms which
were never to be used was not a demand "for services which are not
performed or not to be performed." In the companion decision, NLRB v.
Gamble Enterprises, Inc., 73 S.Ct. 560 (1953) the Supreme Court ruled
that the demand of a musicians union that a theater employ a local
orchestra to play overtures, intermissions, "chasers" and like numbers,
as a condition of its consent to local appearance of travelling bands, was
similarly not a demand for "services which are not performed or not to
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be performed." The Court said that payments for "standing by" were
not payments for services performed, but emphasized that the condition
imposed by the union here was that local musicians actually be per-
mitted to play, and therefore did not fall within the prescribed category.
The fact that the employer did not need the local musicians nor desire
their services did not alter the fact that they were not demanding pay for
unperformed services, and this is the full extent of the definition in the
statute.
It is apparent therefore, that the main issue in these two cases was
whether work or services to be actually performed, although forced upon
the employer against his will, is within the definition of an unfair labor
practice as set out in § 8(b) (6) of the Labor Management Relations
Act.
In Tennessee Coal, Iron and R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321
U.S. 590 (1944), the Court held that any time spent by iron ore miners
in travelling underground in the mines to their places of work con-
stituted work itself, for which compensation was required. The miners
travelling underground were engaged in a process or occupation which
was necessary to actual production; and such activity on their part was
more than mere standing and waiting for work. The reason such travel
time constituted compensable work is obvious. During their hazardous
journey into the depths of the mine, which journey was required by their
employer, the miners were actually working because they were forced
by necessity to maintain a constant vigilance to avoid such dangers as
low ceilings, overhanging beams, pitfalls and other obstacles.
A similar decision was rendered one year later in the closely analgous
situation of bituminous coal miners. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local
No. 6167 (UMW), 325 U.S. 161 (1945). The ruling stated that all
mental or physical exertion whether burdensome or not is compensable
if it is either controlled or required by the employer and pursued pri-
marily and necessarily for his benefit.
The conclusion was reached in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.,
328 U.S. 680 (1946) that various preliminary activities of employees
after arriving at their work benches constituted compensable work where
such activities were controlled or required by the employer and were
pursued necessarily and primarily for his benefit. The tribunal said in
328 U.S. at 693:
These activities .. .involve exertion of a physical nature, controlled or
required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the
employer's benefit. They are performed solely on the employer's premises
and are a necessary prerequisite to productive work .... Hence they con-
stitute work that must be accorded appropriate compensation under the
statute.
These cases suggest that the proper test to determine whether work or
services is compensable is whether it is required by, or is under the con-
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trol of, the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for his own
economic benefit in the operation of his business. To say that the services
involved in the instant case fell within the category of compensable work
would be a gross distortion of fact. The publishers neither required nor
wanted the advertising forms duplicated. The typesetters were merely
whiling away the hours until some other job came along that they could
do and were putting forth no productive effort on behalf of the employer
whatsoever.
It seems reasonable to believe that the "featherbedding" provision of
the Labor Management Relations Act could have been rendered more
meaningful by the application of this test rather than by a strict literal
interpretation of the precise words used. The use of technical interpre-
tation in regard to labor-management relations statutes is mildy reminis-
cent of the decision in Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921),
which many jurists and writers believe resulted in reading into Section
20 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1946) the
very beliefs which that Act was intended and designed to remove. The
unfortunate results that followed that "strict interpretation" decision had
to be finally corrected by legislation in the form of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1946).
However, the instant case indicates that the present-day trend in
American courts is to favor a strict interpretation of the anti-feather-
bedding provisions. Therefore, when a man is engaged in any sort of
mental or physical exertion, whether or not it is productive, needed or
wanted by his employer, he is earning his wages fairly and is not engaged
in any type of unfair labor practice when he demands payment therefor.
The soundness of the rule can be ascertained only through the applica-
tion of the most stem test of all - that of time.
Mark S. Tolle.
TORTS - CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS - IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY
As AFFECTED BY LIABILITY INSURANCE. - Meade v. St. Francis Hos-
pital of Charleston, .-. W. Va ..... , 74 S.E.(2d) 405 (1953). In an action
for trespass on the case in the death of the plaintiff's decedent, a day-old
infant daughter, due to the alleged negligence of the employees of the
defendant charitable hospital, the circuit court certified two questions to
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The first concerned the
tort liability of a charitable hospital, as distinguished from a corporation
organized for profit, towards a paying patient for negligent acts of its
servants. In answer to this question, the court followed the rule it had
enunciated in previous decisions: that a charitable hospital, by public
policy, is not liable for injuries to its patients, paying or non-paying,
resulting from the negligence of its servants, agents or employees in the
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absence of a showing of negligence in the selection of those servants,
agents and employees. Fisher v. Ohio Valley General Hospital Ass'n,
73 S.E.(2d) 667 (W. Va. 1952); Roberts v. Ohio Valley General Hos-
pital, 98 W. Va. 476, 127 S.E. 318 (1925).
The second question presented was whether the procurement of liabil-
ity insurance coverage or the ownership of properties and assets in
excess of the needs of the charitable trust renders a charitable hospital
liable in tort for injuries sustained at the hands of its agents. Having
established the immunity of a charitable hospital from liability generally
on the basis of stare decisis, in answer to the first question, the court
again turned to one of its own prior decisions, Fisher v. Ohio Valley
General Hospital Ass'n, supra, for the answer to the second issue, and
denied that such immunity would be affected by the fact that the hos-
pital maintained liability insurance coverage.
Why do charitable institutions secure liability insurance in juris-
dictions where they are immune from liability? The obvious reason is
their prudent recognition that the substantive law is always subject to
change or modification. Still another reason was given by the court in
Schau v. Morgan, 241 Wis. 334, 6 N.W.(2d) 212, 216 (1942):
We will take notice that public liability insurance policies cover the cost
of defense. When a charitable institution is made a defendant it must
defend the action whether or not it can be held liable. No doubt, charitable
institutions deem it good business judgment to protect themselves against
the costs of the defense of such actions, as well as from loss through
liability imposed by law.
The dictum in the instant case suggests a third reason, namely, that
even in jurisdictions which grant immunity for negligent acts of servants
or agents, the institution may be liable for negligence in the selection of
its personnel in the first place.
The lines of reasoning both for and against the fixing of liability be-
cause of insurance coverage has been fairly consistent, even though the
immunity in the first place may have been granted on the basis of any
one or a combination of five main theories: the trust-fund theory, the
governmental - immunity theory, the respondeat superior - inapplicable
theory, the beneficiary-waiver theory or the public policy theory. See
Note, 25 A.L.R.(2d) 57 (1952).
Four states that admit the trust fund theory of immunity, i.e. that the
funds of a charity are held in trust, the diversion of which the courts
will not permit, have denied that liability insurance would affect such
immunity. Levy v. Superior Court of California, 74 Cal. App. 171, 239
Pac. 1100 (1925); Enman v. Trustees of Boston University, 270 Mass.
299, 170 N.E. 43 (1930); Greatrex v. Evangelical Deaconess Hospital,
261 Mich. 327, 246 N.W. 137 (1933); Herndonv.Masset, 217 N.C. 610,
8 S.E.(2d) 914 (1940). Wisconsin, in refusing to be influenced by the
presence of insurance, predicated immunity on both the "inapplicability
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of respondeat superior," and the analogous governmental immunity
granted to organizations performing quasi public functions. Schau v.
Morgan, supra, 6 N.W.(2d) at 215. Two states uphold immunity under
the public policy theory despite insurance coverage. Woods v. Overlook
Hospital Ass'n, 6 N.J. Super. 47, 69 A.(2d) 742 (App. Div. 1949);
Roberts v. Ohio Valley General Hospital, supra. Insurance does not in-
fluence a combination of the trust fund and public policy theories. Dillie
v. St. Luke's Hospital, 355 Mo. 436, 196 S.W.(2d) 615 (1946).
One argument in favor of fixing liability upon charitable institutions
protected by liability insurance is based on the assertion that a judgment
against the institution in such case would not deplete or divert the
charitable funds from their original purpose. O'Connor v. Boulder Col-
orado Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P.(2d) 835 (1939). But this
argument has been answered in Levy v. Superior Court of California,
supra, 239 Pac. 1102, where the court pointed out that such a rule
would give the trustees of the charity the power to create liability or
waive exemption. Such capacity would then accomplish by indirect action
that which could not be done directly, in effect, destroying the safe-
guards for the protection of the trust funds.
Another court has accounted to its own satisfaction for the imposition
of liability on account of the mere presence of liability insurance. The
court in Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N.E.(2d) 342,
349 (1947) stated:
We hold that where insurance exists and provides a fund from which
tort liability may be collected so as not to impair the trust fund, the defense
of immunity is not available.
Some liability insurance contracts contain a clause expressly author-
izing the insurer to use the defense of immunity of the charitable hos-
pital. Such a clause reduces the premium rate. If the court denies im-
munity in a case involving such a contract, it is, in effect, substantially
altering the contract between the parties. Even though new risks must
always be anticipated by insurers, it is not normally foreseeable that the
making of the contract would destroy a defense on which it was formu-
lated. That the substantive law might be changed is a business risk of
the insurer and a possible vindication of the prudence of the insured, but
to permit the fact that the contract of insurance has been entered into to
destroy the immunity upon which it was premised would make it para-
doxical in its own terms.
Does the distinction in liability based on the presence of insurance
coverage alone have a logical basis? The theory is that under such a rule
a patient in an insured hospital could recover while a patient injured
under identical circumstances, but in an uninsured hospital, could not
recover. In Fisher v. Ohio Valley General Hospital Ass'n, supra, 73
S.E.(2d) at 672, the court expressed its reluctance to descend into "a
quagmire of judicial confusion" that has become the fate of the courts
that have attempted to make a distinction because of insurance coverage.
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Courts could escape from the dilemma by repudiating the immunity
theory in its entirety. In Iowa this was done, ostensibly on the basis that
the public policy considerations that demanded the immunity in the first
place had changed. But here too, there is reason to wonder if insurance
coverage was not the determinant of "public policy", the court stating
in Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.(2dl
151, 154 (1950):
Also, we take judicial notice of the extensive use of the many types of
hospital insurance, as well as liability insurance by the institutions. Thus
it is evident that times have changed and are now changing in the busi-
ness, social, economic and legal worlds.
Colorado and Illinois have fixed liability on the ground that insurance
protection would prevent depletion of the trust fund. O'Connor v.
Boulder Sanitarium Ass'n, supra; Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92
N.E.(2d) 81 (1950). In accord with the view that would hold charitable
institutions liable for the tortious acts of their servants or agents, a
Mississippi court abandoned all the theories of immunity and empha-
sized the effect which the presence of insurance coverage played in its
decision by attempting to minimize it. Mississippi Baptist Hospital v.
Holmes, 55 So.(2d) 142, 153 (Miss. 1951), aff'd, 56 So.(2d) 709 (Miss.
1952).
The West Virginia court, in the instant case followed the present
majority rule by refusing to allow the factor of insurance coverage to
change in toto or even in degree the immunity from tort liability so far
enjoyed by charitable institutions under its jurisdiction. What longevity
this rule will attain in the face of the ever increasing public recognition
of the ability of insurance companies to distribute the risk and pay
huge awards remains to be seen.
Robert D. LeMense.
TORTS-INJURIES SUSTAINED THROUGH DEFECTS IN ICE OF SKATING
RINK - CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND/OR ASSUMPTION OF RISK. -
Filler v. Stenvick, .N. D ..... 56 N.W.(2d) 798 (1953). The plaintiff, a
boy thirteen years old, sued through his guardian for injuries sustained
at an outdoor skating rink. The injury occurred when one of the boy's
skates was caught in a crack in the ice causing him to fall and break his
leg. The crack was alleged to have been the sole cause of the injury, and
evidence proved that the plaintiff was unaware of the defect in the ice
when the injury occurred. The defendant, in his answer, alleged that the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the non obstante
verdicto judgment in favor of the defendant. The affirmance was based
on two grounds, the first of which, that the defendant had exercised due
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care, raises no real issue. The second ground offered, however, was that
the plaintiff had assumed the risk by going skating. As a ground for
affirming the lower court decision, assumption of risk presents an inter-
esting question since there had been no such defense offered below;
the defendant rather had pleaded contributory negligence on the part of
the boy. The defenses of contributory negligence and'assumption of risk
are often employed as defenses in negligence actions with little attempt
made to distinguish between them. What, if any, is the distinction between
contributory negligence and assumption of risk?
The distinction is often ignored by courts or is held to be irrelevant.
In Minnesota, the distinction is regarded as pertinent only in cases in-
volving a master-servant relationship at common law. Hubenette v.
Ostby, 213 Minn. 349, 6 N.W.(2d) 637 (1942). Whenever a person does
not use the care of a reasonable man in avoiding occasions of injury as
well as when he forgoes the necessary precautions to avoid injury after
he finds himself in peril, he is guilty of contributory negligence. The very
act of entering a dangerous situation in disregard of his own safety is a
negligent act, and it therefore contributes to his own injury. Gates v.
Kuckle, 281 Ky. 13, 134 S.W.(2d) 1002 (1939) (parking car on high-
way); Poole v. Lutz & Schmidt, Inc., 273 Ky. 586, 117 S.W.(2d) 575
(1938) (passing through wall being demolished).
The jurisdictions which do distinguish between contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk base their distinctions on divergent princi-
ples. In Daniel v. Tower Trucking Co., 205 S.C. 333, 32 S.E.(2d) 5
(1944), the court held that the distinction was based on the difference
between contract and tort, assumption of risk arising from the former
and contributory negligence from the latter. Therefore, the defendants'
contention that the wife was guilty of assumption of risk in riding with
her husband was invalid because there was no contractural duty be-
tween them.
In Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co., 119 W.Va. 215, 193 S.E. 57 (1937)
a hotel guest fell while walking upon planks covering new cement steps.
Since he knew that they were dangerous, the court in denying recovery
held that plaintiff may be precluded from recovery when he assumes the
risk by voluntarily encountering a known danger even though he uses
more than ordinary care for his safety. Here the court, in distinction to
Daniel v. Tower Trucking Co., supra, stated that the distinction was
not based on any contractural relationship, but rather that the distinc-
tion lies in that the essence of assumption of risk is venturousness, while
that of contributory negligence is carelessness.
The courts have made a further distinction based on the doctrine
of proximate cause. Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351, 189 At. 260, 264
(1937); McEvoy v. City of New York, 266 App. Div. 445, 42
N.Y.S.(2d) 746, 749 (2d Dep't 1943), aff'd, 292 N.Y. 654, 55 N.E.(2d)
517 (1944). In the latter case, the plaintiff tenant fell in a hole in front
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of her house. The city was denied the defense of assumption of risk, the
court stating that assumption of risk is predicated on the maxim volenti
non fit injuria. Thus, if a person voluntarily enters a known and ap-
preciated dangerous situation, he is regarded as waiving any duty that
might be owing to him by another because of his implied consent to the
injury inflicted upon him. Because of his anticipatory denial of any duty
owing to him, it is immaterial that the plaintiff was free from con-
tributory negligence.
Contributory negligence, on the other hand, bars recovery because of
the fact that it intervenes between the defendant's negligence and the
plaintiff's injury so that it supersedes the defendant's negligence as the
proximate cause of the injury. This being the case, no liability attaches
to the defendant's negligence.
In conformity with this distinction, the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence is imposed when the plaintiff fails to exercise the degree of care
that the law imposes for his own safety and well being, Oberheim v.
Pennsylvania Sports and Enterprises, Inc., 358 Pa. 62, 55 A.(2d) 766,
769 (1947); while assumption of risk "is predicated upon the theory
of knowledge and appreciation of the danger and voluntary assent
thereto." Bouchard v. Sicard, 113 Vt. 429, 35 A.(2d) 439, 440 (1944).
In taking into consideration the problem of participation in athletic
activities, the distinction based on proximate cause is adhered to. A
participant, employee or spectator is deemed to have voluntarily assumed
the risk of any injury which he might incur as an ordinary consequence
of his activity, such as a caddy being struck by a golf ball, Page v.
Unterreimer, 106 S.W.(2d) 528 (Mo. App. 1937); a skater being in-
jured due to irregularities in the surface of the ice in a skating rink,
McCullough v. Omaha Coliseum Corp., 144 Neb. 92, 12 N.W.(2d) 639
(1944); repeated falls incurred by a nine year old boy while partici-
pating in the sport afforded by the defendant's public roller skating rink,
Blizzard v. Fitzsimmons, 193 Miss. 484, 10 So.(2d) 343 (1942); a fall
and subsequent injury sustained by the plaintiff while participating in an
organized basketball game, Paine v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 91
N.H. 78, 13 A.(2d) 820 (1940); or in diving from a wet diving board,
Englehardt v. Philipps, 136"Ohio St. 73, 23 N.E.(2d) 829 (1939).
When the danger is so apparent that the ordinary prudent man would
not hazard the risk of injury, the plaintiff is guilty of contributory
negligence in assuming such a flagrant risk. Thus, the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence when she continued skating after realizing
that the ice was getting softer and danger of injury was imminent.
Shields v. Van Kelton Amusement Corp., 228 N.Y. 396, 127 N.E. 261
(1920); cf. Walker v. Rose Hill Amusement Co., 167 So. 144 (La. App.
1936).
In McCullough v. Omaha Coliseum Corp., supra, the ruts in the ice
of a skating rink became covered with ice shavings during the course of
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an evening. The plaintiff fell and while in this prone position, his hand
was severely injured when a skater approaching from behind skated over
the outstretched hand. The plaintiff was held to have assumed the risk
inherent in the uneveness of the surface of the ice, although he did not
foresee the exact cause of his injury. It was sufficient that he recognized
some risk in the uneven surface of the skating rink.
Assumption of risk being predicated on knowledge and appreciation
of the risk, the age, experience, and intelligence of the participant must
be considered in determining whether he was capable of assuming the
risk. It is evident, therefore, that a child must not be held to the same
standard as an adult in determining whether he voluntarily assumed the
risk, but the assumption is that anyone who is capable of intelligently
participating in a sport is capable of .knowing and appreciating the
dangers thereof. Englehardt v. Philipps, supra.
The rules set forth in the instant case indicate that North Dakota fol-
lows those courts which distinguish between contributory negligence and
assumption of risk on the basis of proximate cause. When the contri-
butory negligence of the injured person is such as to proximately cause
the injury complained of, he is denied any recovery. In this case, how-
ever, the plaintiff was not guilty of any negligence on his own part so
that the only proper defense would b assumption of risk. The plaintiff
assumed the risk of any irregularities or inequalities of the surface of the
ice when he chose to skate on the defendant's skating rink. That the
plaintiff was unaware of the crack which caused the injury is immaterial,
for he entered the rink with full knowledge and appreciation of the
danger that might be incurred. Therefore, the decision rendered on this
ground, regardless of the allegations, was correct.
Michael C. Dionise.
TORTS - MuNcIPAL CORPORATIONS - COLLECTION AND DISPOSAL
OF GARBAGE AS A PROPRIETARY FUNCTION.-Hutton v. Martin, _-Wash.
.. 252 P.(2d) 581 (1953). The plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate
of her husband, brought this action for his wrongful death against the
city of Grandview and its employee, the driver of the garbage truck
which collided with the deceased's automobile. The evidence presented
was contradictory, the truck driver claiming that the deceased was
driving on the wrong side of the road, though evidence was also presented
tending to show that the truck driver was himself on the wrong side of
the road. The jury accepted the evidence of the plaintiff and returned a
verdict against both defendants.
However, the trial court granted the city's motion for a judgment non
obstante verdicto, basing their action on a previous Washington decision,
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Krings v. City of Bremerton, 22 Wash.(2d) 220, 155 P.(2d) 493
(1943), which had ruled that the collection of garbage was a govern-
mental function, in the operation of which municipalities are not liable
for torts. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington overruled the
decision in the Krings case, establishing as the law in that state today
that garbage collection is a proprietary and not a governmental function,
and that, therefore, the city was liable.
There appears to be a clear split in the authorities as to whether
garbage collection and like activities on the part of municipalities are
governmental or proprietary functions. This decision by the Washington
Supreme Court, particularly since it required an express overruling of
a previous decision, may indicate a trend in this field.
The basic principle behind the immunity given to municipalities is
stated in Riddoch v. State, 68 Wash. 329, 123 Pac. 450, 452 (1912):
Municipal corporations enjoy their immunity from liability for torts only
in so far as they partake of the state's immunity, and only in the exercise
of those governmental powers and duties imposed upon them in repre-
senting the state.
See also 18 McQuImmN, MUNCIPAL Co~P.oATIoNs § 53.01, (3d ed.
1950). Therefore, when the municipality is acting for its own benefit in
its corporate capacity, it is liable. Riddoch v. State, supra. The courts
are thus presented with the problem of separating all the activities of a
municipality into non-liable governmental activities and liable corporate
activities. On which side of the dividing line fall such things as fire pro-
tection, the operation of a toll bridge, garbage collection, running a gas
plant or the collection of junk, to mention a few? Are they governmental
or corporate functions?
The courts frequently ask: is this activity carried on by the munici-
pality one that the state has an interest in encouraging in that it benefits
all the citizens of the state? In City of Pass Christian v. Fernandez, 100
Miss. 76, 56 So. 329 (1911), the court held that hauling trash is not a
duty the states owes to all its citizens and therefore, a city in doing this
does not share in the sovereignty and immunity of the state.
In City of Brunswick v. Volpian, 67 Ga. App. 654, 21 S.E.(2d) 442
(1942), plaintiff's husband was killed when a city garbage truck was
negligently backed over the sidewalk upon which he was walking. Re-
covery was denied by the Georgia court which held that the collection of
garbage by a municipality is a governmental function, on the grounds
that the city is acting for the public health. In Imes v. City of Fremont,
58 Ohio App. 335, 16 N.E.(2d) 584 (1938), an Ohio court recognized
garbage collection as a governmental function, indicating a trend in that
state which would recognize all municipal activities which promote health
and sanitation as protected activities of the sovereign.
The majority position on this point is well stated in Scibilia v. City of
Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549, 124 Atl. 273, 276 (1924):
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The care of public health is undoubtedly a subject-matter of general
concern, and how it shall be accomplished is a public question. When the
Legislature leaves its accomplishment to any degree in the hands of the
municipalities, they act as government agencies, and not as business cor-
porations... . That cleanliness makes for health must be accepted as a
truism, and that the regular systematic gathering by municipalities of
refuse, including ashes, and the proper, orderly and efficient disposal thereof
promotes cleanliness, is apparent.
The Oklahoma court, in Spaur v. City of Pawkuska, 172 Okla. 285, 43
P. (2d) 408 (1935), recognized that the great weight of authority regards
the cleaning of streets and the collection of garbage as a health measure
and a governmental function, and therefore, no liability would attach to
the city for injuries inflicted through negligence in carrying them out.
The minority position, on the other hand, refuses to recognize any
good reason for denying recovery from the municipality to a citizen
injured or otherwise harmed through the negligence of one of its agents.
Kaufman v. City of Tallahassee, 84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697, 699 (1922);
City of Tallahassee v. Kaufman, 87 Fla. 118, 100 So. 150, 152 (1924).
Consistent with this denial of municipal immunity, the Florida courts,
to distinguish between governmental and proprietary functions, apply
the test whether the city's activity works "for the specific benefit and
advantage of the urban community embraced within the corporated
boundaries" or for the benefit of the people of the state outside as well
as within the city. Such a test was applied in Chardkoff Junk Co. v. City
of Tampa, 102 Fla. 501, 135 So. 457 (1931), where the court held that
maintaining an incinerator for burning refuse was a proprietary activity,
declaring, 135 So. at 459-60:
[The incinerator] is especially maintained to peculiarly promote the
comfort, convenience, and welfare of the citizens of the municipality, and
such benefits are not enjoyed by, nor do the results accomplished affect,
the general public beyond the corporate limits.
Consequently, when the issue as to the nature of garbage collection arose
in a later case, it was declared to be a proprietary function as it bene-
fited only the people within the city of Tampa. Amoak v. City of
Tampa, 123 Fla. 716, 167 So. 528 (1936). Cf. City of Pass Christian v.
Fernandez, supra.
In the instant case, the court noted that the decision in Krings v. City
of Bremerton, supra, which had been cited by the lower court as con-
trolling, seemed to flow from the holding of a still earlier case, Hagerman
v. City of Seattle, 189 Wash. 694, 66 P.(2d) 1151 (1937). In this latter
case, a truck maintained by the health department of the city of Seattle
was carrying empty vegetable crates, laundry, and medical equipment
from a tubercular sanatorium partly maintained by the city. The truck
collided with plaintiff's car injuring him. The court, in denying liability,
held that the service rendered by the truck at the time was a govern-
mental function "in the interest of the public generally and not for the
city specially."
